Boundaries as an Enhancement Technique for Physical Layer Security by Koufos, Konstantinos & Dettmann, Carl P.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
04
18
6v
3 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
3 M
ay
 20
18
1
Boundaries as an Enhancement Technique for
Physical Layer Security
Konstantinos Koufos and Carl P. Dettmann
Abstract—In this paper, we study the receiver performance
with physical layer security in a Poisson field of interferers. We
compare the performance in two deployment scenarios: (i) the
receiver is located at the corner of a quadrant, (ii) the receiver is
located in the infinite plane. When the channel state information
(CSI) of the eavesdropper is not available at the transmitter, we
calculate the probability of secure connectivity using the Wyner
coding scheme, and we show that hiding the receiver at the
corner is beneficial at high rates of the transmitted codewords and
detrimental at low transmission rates. When the CSI is available,
we show that the average secrecy capacity is higher when the
receiver is located at the corner, even if the intensity of interferers
in this case is four times higher than the intensity of interferers
in the bulk. Therefore boundaries can also be used as a secrecy
enhancement technique for high data rate applications.
Index Terms—Interference modeling, physical layer security,
stochastic geometry.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the forecasted deployment of indoor ultra-dense wire-
less networks, it becomes important to develop models that
consider the impact of boundaries in the performance anal-
ysis [1]–[6]. It is well-known that close to the boundary,
the connection probability degrades due to isolation [1], [5],
but it improves in terms of interference [2], [4]. Analytical
models considering finite deployment areas have so far been
used to study spatial and temporal interference aspects [2]–
[4], optimize the base station density in cellular networks [2],
assess millimeter-wave network performance [6], etc.
Physical layer security (PLS) without exchanging secret
keys was first proposed by Wyner [7], and refers to the
protection of information messages against eavesdropping with
the aid of channel coding. PLS would be well-suited for
devices with light computational power, e.g., in certain types
of sensor networks, where conventional security techniques
fail [8]. Nevertheless, the impact of boundaries on connectivity
and rate with PLS has so far received limited attention.
A great deal of research has adopted a type of random
geometric graphs, known as the secrecy graph [9]–[11],
and studied the Probability Distribution Function (PDF) of
the in- and out-connectivity degree with PLS, the isolation
probabilities, percolation threholds, etc. Another category of
research considered the impact of interference on PLS, and
applied stochastic geometry to study the performance for
the typical user in networks with infinite extent [12]–[15].
In [12], the trade-off between the connection and the secrecy
K. Koufos and C.P. Dettmann are with the School of Math-
ematics, University of Bristol, BS8 1TW, Bristol, UK. {K.Koufos,
Carl.Dettmann}@bristol.ac.uk
This work was supported by the EPSRC grant number EP/N002458/1 for
the project Spatially Embedded Networks.
probabilities in cellular systems is studied, and in [13] it
is shown that cluttered environments and blockage can be
helpful in meeting secrecy constraints. In [14], secure vehicle-
to-vehicle communication is considered; a subset of antennas
is used for beamforming towards the receiver, while the rest
send jamming signals towards other directions. In [15], relays
forward the data between the sensors and the sinks, and their
density is optimized for maximizing the average secrecy rate.
A. Related work − Secrecy enhancement techniques
In general, protecting the information messages against
eavesdropping with PLS comes along with a cost on the con-
nection probability [12] and the throughput [16]. To mitigate
the cost, secrecy enhancement techniques may be applied,
especially when the density of eavesdroppers is high [17],
[18]. When the channel state information (CSI) of the in-
tended receiver is known, eigen-beamforming can be used to
maximize the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the intended
channel [19]. Eigen-beamforming outperforms sectoring at the
cost of knowing the CSI instead of the direction [19]. Secrecy
can be further enhanced when artificial noise is transmitted to
the direction of the other sectors or to the null space of the
intended channel [20]. Combining artificial noise transmission
with multi-antenna techniques is also considered in [18]. In
this study, the power levels of the information signal and the
artificial noise are allocated to minimize the secrecy outage
probability. The transmission of artificial noise works particu-
larly well for secrecy enhancement, when the eavesdropper has
fewer antennas than the transmitter, otherwise transmission of
artificial fast fading achieves better secrecy because it prevents
the eavesdropper from estimating the channel [21]. With single
antenna equipment, it might be possible for the receivers
to transmit jamming signals while receiving, provided they
possess good self-interference cancellation mechanisms [24],
[25]. Artificial noise and beamforming come with a power
and computational cost for the transmitter. Other alternatives
for secrecy enhancement include multi-user scheduling [22],
[23] which enhances the capacity of the main channel while
leaving the capacity of the wiretap channel unaffected, and
cooperative diversity which uses the best relay(s) in terms of
secrecy capacity to forward the information messages [22].
Finally, when the transmitter can obtain some information
about the location of the eavesdroppers, guard zones can be
constructed; each transmitter will send confidential informa-
tion when its guard zone is free from eavesdroppers, and the
secrecy transmission capacity, especially under high security
constraints, is enhanced [16].
The information theoretic approaches [9]–[11] and the
analysis using stochastic geometry [12]–[20] assume that the
2locations of the transmitters and the eavesdroppers follow the
uniform distribution in the infinite plane. To the best of our
knowledge, the only available studies considering the impact
of boundaries on secrecy performance are [26], [27]. The study
in [26] neglects the interference effects, and shows that the
mean in- and out-connectivity degrees with PLS in a quadrant
are not necessarily equal, unlike in the infinite plane. The study
in [27] considers a transmitter-receiver pair and a Poisson
Point Process (PPP) for the locations of eavesdroppers inside
an L-sided convex polygon. The secrecy rate is studied for
different L’s. Interference effects are neglected too.
B. Related work − Performance of wireless networks in
confined areas
The performance evaluation of wireless networks with ir-
regular structure in the presence of interference has been
mostly asymptotic, assuming a PPP for the locations of base
stations and users in a space with infinite extent [28]. In
practice, wireless networks are limited by physical boundaries
once deployed indoors, and they may also offer services over
limited locations, e.g., public outdoor hotspots. Finite areas
would naturally complicate the analysis because the notion of
typical receiver is no longer valid; the performance becomes
dependent on the location and the shape of the area. At
the same time, the asymptotic assumption underestimates the
performance for networks with low densities and also near the
boundaries, where the interference would be naturally less [2].
The moment generating function of interference due to a
Binomial Point Process at the origin of a d-dimensional ball
is derived in [29]. Over there, it is also shown that the PDF
of interference converges to Gaussian for a large number of
interferers. The study in [30] extends the statistical analysis of
interference for arbitrarily-shaped areas. When the point where
the interference statistics are collected is located outside of the
area generating the interference, e.g., primary-secondary sys-
tem set-up, the moments of interference (also cross-moments)
can be well-approximated using integration [31], [32].
The location-dependent property of outage probability over
finite areas is also highlighted in [33] for ad hoc networks and
in [34] for heterogeneous cellular networks. Finite deployment
areas are often associated with a non-uniform PDF of user
location, as an attempt to model the impact of population
density and/or mobility [35]. For a random waypoint mobility
model, the mean interference at the origin is asymptotically
twice the mean interference due to a uniform mobility model
because the users are concentrated towards the center of the
area [35]. The temporal statistics of interference and outage
become also location dependent, with higher correlation close
to the boundary, where the degree of mobility is less [36].
C. Motivation and list of contributions
With boundaries, the interference field becomes nonhomo-
geneous. Therefore a natural question to ask is whether placing
the receiver close to the boundary, where the interference is
less, can enhance PLS. Before looking at the impact of bound-
aries on the secrecy performance, let us consider the case,
where the receiver and eavesdropper are deployed in the infi-
nite plane (or in the bulk of the deployment area), and discuss
the impact of interferer’s intensity on the probability of secure
connectivity, i.e., the joint event of successful decoding at the
receiver and failure to decode at the eavesdropper [37], [38].
We assume a single receiver and eavesdropper at fixed and
known locations in a homogeneous Poisson field of interferers.
The signal level over the main and the eavesdropper channels
stay the same; it is only the interference level changing. When
the intensity of interferers decreases, the interference level
becomes less at the receiver and the eavesdropper. In that
case, the probability of secure connectivity should decrease at
low rates of the transmitted codewords (with reference to the
Wyner encoding scheme), because the eavesdropper becomes
capable of decoding low-rate transmissions almost surely. On
the other hand, at high rates of the transmitted codewords,
the probability of secure connectivity should increase because
the performance is dominated by the connection probability
of the receiver, which increases under a lower intensity of
interferers. The above discussion gives an initial insight into
the impact of boundaries on secure connectivity but it does
not reveal the complete story. Placing the receiver close to
the boundary is not equivalent to placing the receiver in the
bulk along with a reduction in the intensity of interferers. The
boundary introduces a trade-off which does not exist in the
bulk and it is discussed next.
Let us consider a quadrant, where the receiver is placed at
the corner, i.e., at the point of minimum interference, and the
eavesdropper along the side. The interference at the receiver
and the eavesdropper is correlated because it is due to the same
set of interferers [39]. We will show that the spatial correlation
of interference is higher along the boundary than in the bulk,
for the same distance separation between the receiver and the
eavesdropper. Therefore placing the receiver at the corner is
detrimental for PLS because the reception conditions at the
receiver and the eavesdropper become favorable at the same
time. On the other hand, placing the receiver at the corner
should benefit PLS because the eavesdropper is exposed to
higher interference than the receiver. The motivation of this
paper is to study this interplay.
The impact of interference correlation on the probability
of secure connectivity in infinite cellular systems has been
recently studied in [38]. Over there it is shown that interference
correlation plays a significant role in secrecy performance
when the typical eavesdropper is located close to the typical
user. In this paper, we consider an ad hoc type of system
and compare the receiver performance at the corner and in
the bulk of the deployment area considering both cases with
known and unknown CSI of the eavesdropper channel at the
transmitter. We have in mind an indoor setting, e.g., industrial
automation in a factory, smart home etc., where it is expected
to have both high rate transmissions, e.g., video content using
machine-to-machine technology, and/or low rate transmissions
for exchanging measurement information and data fusion
between low cost sensors. In the presence of eavesdroppers,
we would like to identify whether it is beneficial to deploy the
network elements near the boundaries or not and under which
conditions on the transmission rate. The main findings are:
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Fig. 1. The geometry in which the receiver is located at the corner of the
deployment area. The location of the eavesdropper is (u, 0).
• When the CSI of the eavesdropper is not available at
the transmitter, it is beneficial to hide the receiver at
the corner for high rates of the transmitted codewords
because the performance is dominated by the connection
probabilities of the receiver and the eavesdropper. At the
corner, the receiver is exposed to lower interference as
compared to an eavesdropper located along the boundary.
• When the CSI of the eavesdropper is not available at the
transmitter, it is detrimental to hide the receiver at the
corner for low rates of the transmitted codewords because
an eavesdropper which is located along the boundary is
also exposed to low interference thus, it can intercept the
transmissions with high probability.
• When the transmitter can adapt the rate based on the in-
stantaneous CSI, the average capacity with PLS is higher
at the corner even if the intensity of interferers over there
is four times higher than the intensity of interferers in the
bulk. This means that the impact of higher interference
at the eavesdropper than at the receiver dominates over
the higher correlation of interference along the boundary
than in the bulk.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the system model. In Section III, we
calculate the mean, the variance, the correlation coefficient of
interference, and the connection probability of the receiver and
the eavesdropper. In Section IV, we calculate the probability
of secure connectivity assuming that the CSI is not available at
the transmitter. In Section V, we assume perfect knowledge of
the CSI and calculate the average secrecy capacity. Section IV
and Section V contain the main analysis of this paper and the
comparison of the receiver performance at the boundary and
in the bulk. In Section VI, we summarize the results of this
paper and outline future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an ad hoc network where the locations of the
transmitters follow the PPP with intensity λ, and each receiver
is placed at a fixed link distance d0 and a random angle θ from
the associated transmitter, see Fig. 1 for an illustration. The
transmit power level is normalized to unity. We would like
to assess the performance, i.e., connectivity and rate, with
PLS. In areas with boundaries, the performance is location-
dependent. We consider two locations for the receiver: at the
corner of a quadrant and in the bulk of the deployment area. In
addition, we consider a single eavesdropper which is located
at distance u from the receiver. When the receiver is located
at the corner, the eavesdropper is located at the boundary.
The locations of the receiver and the eavesdropper are fixed
and known. The origin of the coordinate system is set at the
location of the receiver unless otherwise stated. The location
of the eavesdropper is (u, 0). The transmitter, the receiver
and the eavesdropper are equipped with a single antenna.
The eavesdropper does not employ any advanced technique
for intercepting the transmitter’s message, e.g., successive
interference cancellation, and the ad hoc network does not
apply any secrecy enhancement technique, e.g., artificial noise.
Considering just a single eavesdropper at an arbitrary lo-
cation may seem overly simplistic, but it is used to get
an insight on the comparison of secrecy performance with
and without boundaries. Considering two-dimensional random
locations for the eavesdroppers has been left as a future topic
to study but the main conclusions of this paper are unlikely
to change. After all, if we neglect eavesdroppers’ collusion, a
high (low) intensity of eavesdroppers means that the distance
separation between the receiver and the most detrimental
eavesdropper would be small (large), and the results of this
paper are still applicable. For presentation brevity, we will also
neglect the impact of interferers possibly located outside of
the boundaries. Incorporating an additional interference field
with a higher propagation pathloss attenuation factor and/or
penetration losses will increase the length of the expressions
for the mean, the variance and the connection probability for
the receiver located at the corner and for the eavesdropper
along the boundary. Ignoring these interferers allows us to
relate the statistics of interference for the receiver located at the
corner and in the bulk in a simple manner. This facilitates the
presentation of the proofs of lemmas, while the methodology
and the conclusion of this paper will not change. In a practical
system, one may also argue that the effect of interferers
deployed outside of the boundaries would be negligible in case
millimeter wave propagation frequency is considered.
When the receiver is located at the corner, the location of
the transmitter associated to it, hereafter the transmitter, is
(d0 cos θ, d0 sin θ), where the Random Variable (RV) θ follows
the uniform distribution in
[
0, pi2
]
, thus fΘ(θ) =
2
pi . In the
bulk, the location of the transmitter should follow the uniform
distribution in [0, 2pi]. Nevertheless, we would like to compare
the performance at the two locations on a fair basis. In order to
do that, the distribution of signal level over the eavesdropper
channel should stay the same. Therefore we constrain the
location of the transmitter over
[
0, pi2
]
in both cases. We
denote by Z the RV describing the distance-based propagation
pathloss over the eavesdropper channel, Z=g
(
‖d0e
jΘ−u‖
)
,
where g (r) =min (1, r−η) is the distance-based propagation
pathloss function and η>2 is the pathloss exponent. The PDF
fZ(z) is derived in the Appendix.
4Due to the Slivnyak’s Theorem, the locations of the trans-
mitters generating interference to the receiver and the eaves-
dropper, hereafter the interferers (or the users), follow a PPP
with intensity λ. Their transmission probability is ξ. For a
high intensity of active users λξ, the impact of noise can
be ignored in the performance assessment. The fast fading
h over all channels, i.e., main channel, eavesdropper chan-
nel and interfering channels is independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) following the exponential PDF with unit
mean E {h}= 1. The assumption of independent fast fading
between the receiver and the eavesdropper should be valid for
distances u larger than half the wavelength. We assume that
the considered distances meet this constraint.
In order to assess the performance with secrecy, we follow
the Wyner encoding scheme [7], where the rate of transmitted
codewords is Rt, and the rate of confidential messages is
Rs. Let us denote by γx,r the RV describing the instanta-
neous Signal-to-Interference Ratio (SIR) at the receiver, where
x ∈ {bu,co} indicates the reveiver location in the bulk or at
the corner. The connection probability of the receiver can be
calculated as Pcx,r=P {γx,r>µ}, where µ=2
Rt − 1. Similarly,
let us denote by γx,e(u) the RV describing the SIR at the
eavesdropper, and by Pcx,e(u)=P {γx,e(u)>σ} the probability
that the eavesdropper succeeds to decode the transmitter’s
message. According to the Wyner scheme, σ=2Re−1, where
the rate Re=Rt−Rs reflects the rate cost to secure the message
against the eavesdropper. For a positive secrecy rate Rs≤Rt,
it is required that µ≥ σ. When the CSI of the main and the
eavesdropper channels is not available at the transmitter, the
rates Rt, Rs are kept fixed. A pair of rates (Rt, Rs) can be
associated with a probability of secure connectivity, Pscx , which
can be expressed as the joint event [37], [38]
P
sc
x (u)=P (γx,r > µ, γx,e(u) < σ) . (1)
When the CSI at the receiver and the eavesdropper is
perfectly known, the transmitter can adapt the transmission
rate equal to max
{
0, log
(
1+γx,r
1+γx,e
)}
, and the performance is
described in terms of average secrecy capacity [40], [41].
C
sc
x(u) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ γx,r
0
log2
(
1 + γx,r
1 + γx,e
)
fr,e(γx,r, γx,e) dγx,edγx,r, (2)
where fr,e(γx,r, γx,e) is the joint PDF of the SIR at the receiver
and the eavesdropper.
Performance studies of PLS with CSI imperfections due to
estimation errors at the receiver and/or limited feedback can
be found in [42], [43] and references therein. Studying the
impact of imperfections on the performance comparison with
and without boundaries is a topic for future work.
While studying the performance with secrecy, we will need
the mean and the variance of interference at the receiver
and the eavesdropper, the correlation of interference between
the two locations, and the connection probabilities. These
quantities are calculated in the next section.
III. INTERFERENCE AND CONNECTION PROBABILITY
In the bulk, the mean and the variance of interference are
independent of the location. Therefore it suffices to calculate
the moments of interference at the receiver
E {Ibu,r} =λξ
∫∞
0
∫ 2pi
0
g (r) rdφdr
(a)
= λξηpiη−2 .
Var {Ibu,r}=2λξ
∫∞
0
∫ 2pi
0
g2(r) rdφdr
(b)
= 2λξηpiη−1 ,
(3)
where (a) and (b) follow after taking into account the piece-
wise nature of the propagation pathloss function g(·), and the
factor 2 in the calculation of the variance comes from the
second moment of a unit-mean exponential RV, E
{
h2
}
=2.
The mean and the variance of interference at the corner of a
quadrant can be calculated after scaling the respective statistics
in the bulk, see equation (3), by 14 , i.e., E {Ico,r}=
1
4E {Ibu,r}
and Var {Ico,r}=
1
4Var {Ibu,r}. In addition, the mean and the
variance of the interference at the eavesdropper located at the
boundary and at distance u from the corner become easier to
calculate after shifting the origin to (u, 0).
E {Ico,e(u)} =λξ
∫∞
0
∫ φco(u,r)
0 g (r) rdφdr.
Var {Ico,e(u)}=2λξ
∫∞
0
∫ φco(u,r)
0 g
2(r) rdφdr,
(4)
where φco(u, r)=pi for r≤u, and φco(u, r)=pi − arccos
(
u
r
)
for r>u.
After differentiating equations (4) with respect to u using
the integral rule, one may show that the mean and the variance
increase as we move away from the corner. Therefore an
eavesdropper at the boundary is exposed to higher interference
than the receiver at the corner. Due to the piecewise nature
of the propagation pathloss function, we have to separate
between two cases, u≷ 1, in equation (4), before expressing
E {Ico,e(u)} and Var {Ico,e(u)} in semi-closed form.
E{Ico,e(u)}
u<1
= λξ
(
pi
∫ u
0
rdr+
∫ 1
u
(
pi−arccos
(
u
r
))
rdr+∫∞
1
(
pi−arccos
(
u
r
))
r1−ηdr
)
= λξ (η−2)u
√
1−u2+η(pi−arccos(u))
2(η−2) −
u 2F1( 12 ,
η−1
2 ;
η+1
2 ;u
2)
(η−1)(η−2)
E{Ico,e(u)}
u>1
= λξ
(
pi
2(η−2) −
√
piu2−ηΓ( η−12 )
2(η−2)Γ(η/2)
)
Var{Ico,e(u)}
u<1
= 2λξ
(
u
√
1−u2
2 +
η(pi−arccos(u))
2(η−1) −
u
2(η−1)(2η−1) 2F1
(
η− 12 ,
1
2 ;η+
1
2 ;u
2
))
Var{Ico,e(u)}
u>1
= 2λξ
2piηΓ(η)−u2−2η√pi Γ(η− 12 )
4Γ(η)(η−1) ,
(5)
where 2F1 is the Gaussian hypergeometric function [44,
pp. 556], and Γ(x)=
∫∞
0 t
x−1e−tdt is the Gamma function.
In order to calculate the covariance of interference between
the receiver and the eavesdropper, one should keep in mind that
the set of interferers for the two locations are fully correlated.
The Pearson correlation coefficient takes the following form:
ρx(u)=
λξ
∫∞
0
∫ φx
0
g(r) g
(
‖rejφ−u‖
)
rdφdr√
Var {Ix,e(u)}
√
Var {Ix,r}
, (6)
where x∈{co,bu}, φbu=2pi, φco=
pi
2 , and the interference in the
bulk is independent of location, Var{Ibu,e(u)}=Var{Ibu,r}∀u.
The correlation coefficient ρx is independent of the user
density λ and user activity ξ. In addition, we have seen that
the user activity is just a scaling factor in the calculation of the
mean and variance. Hereafter, we omit the activity probability
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Fig. 2. Spatial correlation coefficient of interference at distance u from
the receiver. The receiver is placed at the corner and in the bulk. In the
numerator of equation (6), the integral is evaluated numerically. At the corner,
equation (6) is verified with simulations. Pathloss exponent η=4, and user
density λ=0.2.
from the expressions for brevity, and the user intensity λ
describes the intensity of users after thinning with ξ.
In Fig. 2, we depict the correlation coefficient at the corner
and in the bulk with respect to the distance u. We see
that placing the receiver at the corner increases the spatial
correlation of interference for the same distance separation
between the receiver and the eavesdropper.
In order to calculate the connection probability of the
receiver in the interference-limited regime, we need to eval-
uate the Laplace Transform of the interference Pcx,r =
E
{
e−sIx,r
}
[28]. Note that the impact of noise can be simply
incorporated by scaling with a constant the Laplace Transform
of the interference. Using the Probability Generating Func-
tional (PGFL) of the PPP we get
P
c
x,r=exp
(
−λ
∫ ∞
0
∫ φx
0
sg(r)
1+sg(r)
rdφdr
)
(7a)
=exp

−λφx

 s
2 (1+s)
+
s 2F1
(
1, η−2η ;
2η−2
η ;−s
)
η − 2



, (7b)
where s= µg(d0) .
Let us assume for the moment that the location of the
transmitter is fixed and known. In order to calculate the
connection probability of the eavesdropper in the bulk, one
should substitute φx = 2pi, and se =
σ
g(‖d0ejθ−u‖) = σz
−1
instead of s in equation (7b).
P
c
bu,e(u)=exp

−2piλ

 se
2 (1+se)
+
se2F1
(
1,η−2η ;
2η−2
η ;−se
)
η − 2



. (8)
When the eavesdropper is located at the boundary, one
should substitute se instead of s, and φco(u, r) instead of φx in
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Fig. 3. Connection probability for the eavesdropper w.r.t. the distance u from
the corner. Pathloss exponent η=4, and user density λ=0.2. The transmitter
is located at the boundary at (0, 1). The calculation uses equations (9a)
and (9b) and the integrals I1, Iu are evaluated numerically. The bound uses
the approximations in equations (10a) and (10b).
equation (7a). After shifting the origin to (u, 0) and separating
between u≷1 in the double integral in equation (7a), we get
P
c
co,e(u)
u<1
=exp
(
−
λse
2(1+se)
(
pi+u
√
1−u2−arccos(u)
)
−λI1
)
(9a)
P
c
co,e(u)
u>1
=exp
(
−λpise
( 1
2(1+se)
+
2F1
(
1,η−2η ;
2η−2
η ;−se
)
η−2
−
u2−η
η − 2
2F1
(
1,
η−2
η
;
2η−2
η
;−
se
uη
))
− λIu
)
, (9b)
where I1 =
∫∞
1
(
pi−arccos
(
u
r
))
se r
se+rη
dr, and Iu =∫∞
u
(
pi−arccos
(
u
r
))
se r
se+rη
dr.
If we bound the inverse trigonometric function, pi −
arccos
(
u
r
)
> pi2+
u
r , ∀r≥u, we get a tight upper bound on the
connection probability of the eavesdropper after substituting
the following lower bound approximations in (9).
I1 &
us
1/η
e
sinc(pi/η)
− u 2F1
(
1,
1
η
;
η + 1
η
;−
1
se
)
+
pise
2 (η − 2)
2F1
(
1,
η − 2
η
;
2η − 2
η
;−se
)
(10a)
Iu &
us
1/η
e
sinc(pi/η)
− u22F1
(
1,
1
η
;
η + 1
η
;−
uη
se
)
+
piseu
2−η
2 (η − 2)
2F1
(
1,
η − 2
η
;
2η − 2
η
;−
se
uη
)
, (10b)
where sinc(x)= sin(x)x .
The tightness of the bound is illustrated in Fig. 3. The
connection probability of the eavesdropper decreases rapidly
along the boundary because the interference becomes higher
over there, and at the same time the signal level over the
eavesdropper channel decreases. The trend is similar when the
location of the transmitter follows the uniform distribution. In
that case, the connection probability can be calculated after
6integrating (numerically) equations (8)−(9b) over the PDF of
the signal level over the eavesdropper channel fZ(z).
The connection probabilities for fixed and known trans-
mitter’s location given in equations (8) and (9b) would be
of use in Section IV while approximating the probability of
secure connectivity at high transmission rates Rt and large
distance separation u between the receiver and the eavesdrop-
per. For a large u, the correlation coefficient of interference
may become negligible, see Fig. 2, and the probability of
secure connectivity can be approximated as the product of the
connection probability of the receiver with the complementary
of the connection probability of the eavesdropper. We will
expand the connection probability of the eavesdropper for
σ→ 0/σ→∞ to approximate the probability of secure con-
nectivity for high/low secrecy rates Rs under the assumption
of uncorrelated interference.
IV. SECURE CONNECTIVITY − UNKNOWN CSI
Using that the fading over the main and the eavesdropper
channels is Rayleigh, the probability of secure connectivity in
equation (1) can be read as
P
sc
x (u)=E
{
e−sIx,r
(
1− e−seIx,e(u)
)}
= Pcx,r−Jx(u), (11)
where Jx(u) = E
{
e−sIx,r−seIx,e(u)
}
is the joint connection
probability of the receiver and the eavesdropper.
In a recently published paper [38], the quantity Jx(u)
has been calculated taking into account the fact that the
interference at the receiver and the eavesdropper is correlated.
In order to take into account the correlation of interference
in our problem setting, we condition on the location θ of
the transmitter, and we average over the fading states of the
interfering channels at the receiver and the eavesdropper, as
well as over the locations and activities of the interferers. After
using the PGFL of the PPP and the fact that the fading samples
in the interfering channels at the receiver and the eavesdropper
are i.i.d. unit-mean exponential RVs we get [38]
Jx(u)=
∫ pi
2
0
exp

−λ∫
Sx
(
1−
1
1+sg (r)
1
1+seg(d)
)
dS

fΘdθ
=
∫
Z
exp

−λ∫
Sx
(
1−
1
1+sg (r)
1
1+σz−1g(d)
)
dS

fZdz (12)
where Sx is the infinite plane for x = bu and the upper-
right quadrant for x = co, dS = rdrdφ is the integration
element, d=‖rejφ−u‖ is the distance between the integration
element and the eavesdropper, s = µg(d0) , se = σz
−1, and
z=g
(
‖d0e
jθ − u‖
)
is the realization of the RV Z describing
the distance-based pathloss over the eavesdropper channel.
Lemma 1. For low transmission rates Rt, the probability of
secure connectivity is higher in the bulk than at the corner.
Proof. A low rate Rt necessitates a low SIR threshold µ.
After expanding around s = 0 equation (7a), keeping up to
the second order terms, we can approximate the connection
probability for low rates Rt as follows
P
c
x,r≈exp
(
−λ
(∫
Sx
(
sg(r)− s2g2(r)
)
dS
))
=exp
(
−sE{Ix,r}+
s2
2
Var(Ix,r)
)
≈1− sE{Ix,r}+
s2
2
(
Var(Ix,r) + E{Ix,r}
2
)
. (13)
In order to approximate the quantity Jx(u) in equation (12)
for low rates Rt, we expand around σz
−1=0 and s=0, again
keeping up to the second order terms.
Jx(u)≈
∫
Z
exp
(
−λ
∫
Sx
(
sg(r)+σz−1g(d)−s2g2(r)−
σ2z−2g2(d)−sσz−1g(r) g(d)
)
dS
)
fZ dz
≈1−sE{Ix,r}−σE
{
Z−1
}
E{Ix,e(u)}+
s2
2Var(Ix,r)+
σ2
2 E
{
Z−2
}
Var(Ix,e(u))+
ρx(u)sσE
{
Z−1
}√
Var(Ix,r)Var(Ix,e(u))+
σ2
2 E
{
Z−1
}2
E{Ix,e(u)}
2
+ s
2
2 E{Ix,r}
2
+
sσE
{
Z−1
}
ρx(u)
√
Var(Ix,r)Var(Ix,e(u)).
(14)
After subtracting equation (14) from equation (13) we get
P
sc
x (u) ≈ σE
{
Z−1
}
E{Ix,e(u)}−
σ2
2
(
E
{
Z−2
}
Var(Ix,e(u))+E
{
Z−1
}2
E{Ix,e(u)}
2
)
−
2ρx(u) sσE
{
Z−1
}√
Var(Ix,r)Var(Ix,e(u)).
(15)
Recall that in the bulk the interference is independent of the
location u, and the probability for secure connectivity can be
simplified after substituting E {Ibu,r} instead of E{Ibu,e(u)} in
equation (15). In addition, due to the fact that E{Ico,e(u)}≤
lim
u→∞
E{Ico,e(u)} =
1
2E{Ibu,r} ∀u, the probability for secure
connectivity at the corner, for low rates Rt, can be upper-
bounded after substituting 12E{Ibu,r} instead of E{Ico,e(u)}
in the first-order term in equation (15). Finally, we get that
limσ→0,s→0
P
sc
co(u)
P
sc
bu
(u) =
E{Z−1}E{Ico,e(u)}
E{Z−1}E{Ibu,e(u)} ≤
E{Ibu,r}
2E{Ibu,r}=
1
2 .
Lemma 1 can be intuitively explained as follows. At the
boundary, the interference is low, thus both the receiver and the
eavesdropper are capable of decoding low rate transmissions
almost surely. Because of that, secure connectivity degrades.
On the other hand, in the bulk, where the mean interference is
at least twice than that at the boundary, there might be network
instances where the eavesdropper may fail to decode a low rate
transmission due to unfortunate interference conditions, and at
the same time the receiver can successfully decode.
A case of particular interest is Rs=0, or equivalently, µ=
σ,γ. In that case, equation (15) is simplified to
P
sc
x (u) ≈ γE
{
Z−1
}
E{Ix,e(u)}−
γ2
2
(
E
{
Z−2
}
Var(Ix,e(u))+E
{
Z−1
}2
E{Ix,e(u)}
2
+
4ρx(u)
g(d0)
E
{
Z−1
}√
Var(Ix,r)Var(Ix,e(u))
)
.
(16)
The accuracy of approximation (15) for the probability of
secure connectivity at the corner and in the bulk is illustrated
in Fig. 4a w.r.t. the secrecy rate Rs≤Rt and a low rate Rt.
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Fig. 4. Validating the approximations for the probability of secure connectivity at low transmission rates Rt. (a) The approximation is given in (15). The
rate of the transmitter codewords is Rt=log2(1 + µ). (b) The approximation is given in (16). The secrecy rate is Rs=0, i.e., µ=σ. In both figures, the
exact probability is calculated numerically based on (11) and (12). Pathloss exponent η=4, user density λ=0.2, u=1, d0=1 unless otherwise stated.
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Fig. 5. Illustrating the approximation accuracy of the bounds given in equation (17) for the corner, and in equation (18) for the bulk at high transmission
rates Rt, low transmission rates Rs and large distance separation u. The distance is selected u=3. The rest of the parameter settings can be found in the
caption of Fig. 4. The exact probability is calculated numerically after substituting equation (12) into (11). In (a) we depict the results only pertinent to the
corner because the probability of secure connectivity at high transmission rates Rt in the bulk is very low. d0=1 unless otherwise stated.
The accuracy of equation (16) is illustrated in Fig. 4b w.r.t.
the rate Rt. In both figures we see that the performance in the
bulk is superior to the corner.
Lemma 2. For high transmission rates Rt and large distance
separation u between the receiver and the eavesdropper, the
probability of secure connectivity is higher at the corner than
in the bulk.
Proof. For a large distance separation u, we may assume
that the interference at the receiver and the eavesdropper is
uncorrelated. In that case, the joint connection probability
Jx(u) is equal to the product of the connection probabilities
of the receiver and the eavesdropper, and the probability of
secure connectivity in equation (11) is simplified to Pscx (u)=
P
c
x,r
(
1− E
{
e−seIx,e(u)
})
. For a high transmission rate Rt
or equivalently for a large µ, the connection probability of
the receiver at the corner can be approximated by expanding
equation (7b) around s→∞, Pcco,r≈ e
− λpis2/η4sinc(2pi/η) . In the bulk,
the exponent should be scaled by four, Pcbu,r≈e
− λpis2/η
sinc(2pi/η) .
The connection probability of the eavesdropper at the
boundary, Pcco,e(u) = E
{
e−seIco,e(u)
}
, can be approximated
after substituting Iu from equation (10b) into (9b). For a
low secrecy rate Rs, or equivalently for a large σ, we can
approximate the connection probability of the eavesdropper as
P
c
co,e≈EZ
{
e−
λpiσ2/ηz−2/η
4sinc(2pi/η)
−uλσ1/ηz−1/η
sinc(pi/η)
}
. In order to obtain a
lower bound for the probability of secure connectivity at the
corner, we can upper-bound the connection probability of the
eavesdropper at the boundary. One way to do that is to fix the
signal level over the eavesdropper channel at the maximum
value z2= |u− d0|
−η
, see the Appendix. Finally, we get
P
sc
co(u) & e
− λpis2/η
4sinc(2pi/η)
(
1−e−
λpiσ2/η(u−d0)
2
4sinc(2pi/η) e−
λσ1/ηu(u−d0)
sinc(pi/η)
)
,
(17)
where it is reasonable to assume that u>d0.
In the bulk, the connection probability of the eavesdropper
8for a low secrecy rate Rs can be approximated as P
c
bu,e ≈
EZ
{
e−
λpiσ2/ηz−2/η
sinc(2pi/η)
}
. An upper-bound for the probability of
secure connectivity can be obtained by fixing the signal level
over the eavesdropper channel at the minimum value z1 =(
d20 + u
2
)−η/2
. Finally, we get
P
sc
bu(u) . e
− λpis2/η
sinc(2pi/η)
(
1− e−
λpiσ2/η(d20+u2)
sinc(2pi/η)
)
. (18)
Let us denote x = λpi4sinc(2pi/η) and y =
λu(u−d0)
sinc(pi/η) . In order
to show that limµ→∞
P
sc
bu(u)
Pscco(u)
< 1, it suffices to show that
lims→∞
exp(−4xs2/η)(1−exp(−4xσ2/η(d20+u2)))
exp(−xs2/η)(1−exp(−xσ2/η(u−d0)2−yσ1/η)) = 0, which
is true. For Rs=0, or equivalently µ=σ,γ, we also get that
limγ→∞
exp
(
− 4x
g(d0)
2/η
γ2/η
)
(1−exp(−4xγ2/η(d20+u2)))
exp
(
− x
g(d0)
2/η
γ2/η
)
(1−exp(−xγ2/η(u−d0)2−yγ1/η))
=0.
When the secrecy rate Rs is high, or equivalently σ is
low, one can approximate the connection probability of the
eavesdropper after substituting equation (10b) into (9b) and
expanding around σ=0.
P
c
co,e(u)≈1−λσ
2/η
EZ
{
(η−1)ηpi−(4−pi+(pi−2) η)u2−η
2 (η−1) (η−2)
z−
2
η
}
.
Since σ→0, it is straightforward to show that lim
µ→∞
P
sc
bu(u)
Pscco(u)
<
1, and the proof is complete.
The intuitive explanation of Lemma 2 is as follows: For a
large distance separation u, the signal level over the eaves-
dropper channel becomes low, and the probability of secure
connectivity at high transmission rates Rt is dominated by the
connection probability of the receiver. Therefore the perfor-
mance is better at the corner, where the interference level is
lower than in the bulk.
The accuracy of the approximations for the probability of
secure connectivity in Lemma 2 is illustrated in Fig. 5 for
distance separation u = 3. At this distance, the correlation
coefficient is less than 10−1 both at the corner and in the
bulk, see Fig. 2. In Fig. 5a, we see that for decreasing σ, or
equivalently, for increasing secrecy rate Rs the approximation
accuracy degrades. As expexted, the approximation accuracy
improves for increasing rate Rt (or µ). In Fig. 5a, we also see
that for high transmission rates Rt, we can allow for increas-
ing secrecy rates Rs over some range, without a noticeable
decrease in the probability of secure connectivity. Finally, we
note that the approximation given in equation (18) for the bulk
is an upper bound only for high µ, σ (not visible in Fig. 5b).
For small distances u, the impact of correlated interference
at the receiver and the eavesdropper should not be ignored.
Extending Lemma 2 for small u and a positive secrecy rate
Rs is tedious. We show the extension only for secrecy rate
Rs = 0, or µ= σ , γ. For presentation clarity, we will also
assume d0=1. These assumptions are discussed after the proof
of this and the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For high transmission rates Rt and small distance
separation u between the receiver and the eavesdropper, the
probability of secure connectivity is higher at the corner than
in the bulk for secrecy rate Rs=0.
Proof. Let us assume that u≤ 1 since the correlation coeffi-
cient of interference is large for small distances u. In addition,
let us assume that γ≥ 1 since we consider high transmission
rates Rt. First, we will approximate the term Jx(u) at high
transmission rates Rt, then the connection probability of the
receiver.
In order to approximate the term Jx(u), we note that for
u≤1, the signal level over the eavesdropper channel becomes
equal to one with probability p, while it takes values from the
continuous distribution fZc with probability (1−p), see the
Appendix for the definition and the derivation of the PDF
fZc(z). Due to the fact that the RV Z follows a mixture
distribution for u ≤ 1, the quantity Jx(u) in equation (12)
can be read as
Jx(u) = p exp
(
−λ
∫
Sx
(
1−
1
1+γg(r)
1
1+γg(d)
)
dS
)
+
(1−p)
∫ z2
z1
exp

−λ∫
Sx
(
1−
1
1+γg(r)
1
1+γz−1g(d)
)
dS

fZcdz (19)
where z1=
(
1 + u2
)−η/2
is the minimum signal level and z2
is the maximum signal level over the eavesdropper channel.
Next, we show how to approximate the integral I(u) =∫ pi/2
0
∫∞
0
(
1− 11+γg(r)
1
1+γg(d)
)
dS at the corner for a large γ.
In order to do that, we will divide the quadrant Sco into disjoint
regions and select a suitable expansion for the terms 11+γg(r)
and 11+γg(d) over each region. For γg(r) > 1, or equivalently
for r < r0, where r0 = γ
1/η, we get 11+γg(r) ≈
1
γg(r) . On
the other hand, for r>r0 the term γg(r) becomes small, and
1
1+γg(r)≈1−γg(r)+γ
2g2(r). The expansion of the term 11+γg(d)
is more involved as it does not depend only on r, but also on φ.
We will split the plane into three regions w.r.t. the distance r:
r<r0, r0≤r≤r0+u and r>r0+u. The corresponding integral
contributions are denoted by Ij(u), I(u)=
∑3
j=1Ij(u).
For r < r0 and angles φ < φ(r), where φ(r) =
min
{
pi
2 , arccos
(
r2+u2−r20
2ur
)}
, the distance d to the eaves-
dropper is small, thus γg(d) > 1 and 11+γg(d) ≈
1
γg(d) . On
the other hand, for r < r0 and φ > φ(r), the distance to
the eavesdropper becomes large, thus the term γg(d) becomes
small, and 11+γg(d) ≈1−γg(d)+γ
2g2(d). Finally, the integral
I1(u) can be approximated as
I1(u) &
∫ r0
0
∫ φ(r)
0
(
1−
1
γ2g(r) g(d)
)
dS+∫ r0
0
∫ pi
2
φ(r)
(
1−
1− γg(d) + γ2g2(d)
γg(r)
)
dS.
(20)
Let us define r1 = r0+u. For r0 ≤ r≤ r1, the term γg(r)
becomes small, while the term γg(d) might be small or large
depending on the angle.
I2(u) &
∫ r1
r0
∫ φ(r)
0
(
1−
1− γg(r) + γ2g2(r)
γg(d)
)
dS+∫ r1
r0
∫ pi
2
φ(r)
(
1−
1− γg(r) + γ2g2(r)
(1−γg(d)+γ2g2(d))
−1
)
dS.
(21)
9Finally, for r > r1, both terms γg(r) , γg(d) become small
independent of the angle φ, thus
I3(u)&
∫ ∞
r1
∫ pi
2
0
(
1−
1− γg(r) + γ2g2(r)
(1− γg(d) + γ2g2(d))
−1
)
dS. (22)
In order to approximate I(u) we need to sum up the
approximations from the different regions. For a small u and
a large γ, we get that φ(r) ≈ pi2 ∀r ≤ r0 and r1 ≈ r0.
Therefore, the terms that dominate the integral I(u) is the
first term in equation (20) and equation (22). Next, we show
how to approximate the dominant terms at a high rate Rt or
equivalently for a large γ.
Since r1 > 1, the leading order approximation for the
integral
∫ pi/2
0
∫∞
r1
(
γg(r)− γ2g2(r)
)
dS is calculated after sub-
stituting g(r) = r−η and performing the integration. Fi-
nally, we get ηpiγ
2/η
4(η−1)(η−2) . On the other hand, the integral∫ pi/2
0
∫∞
r1
(
γg(d)−γ2g2(d)
)
dS cannot be conputed in closed-
form. Nevertheless, after approximating g(d) , g2(d) for a
large r, i.e., g(d) ≈ r−η + ηr−1−ηu cosφ and g2(d) ≈
r−2η+2ηr−1−2ηu cosφ, which should be valid for r1 ≫ u,
we get
(
ηpiγ2/η
4(η−1)(η−2) +
ηuγ1/η
(2η−1)(η−1)
)
. Using the large r ap-
proximation for g(d), the integral γ2
∫ pi/2
0
∫∞
r1
g(r) g(d)dS is
approximated as
(
piγ2/η
4(η−1)−
(2η(pi−1)−pi)uγ1/η
4η−2
)
for a large γ.
The term
∫ pi/2
0
∫∞
r1
(
γ3
(
g(r)g2(d)+g2(r)g(d)
)
−γ4g2(r) g2(d)
)
dS
gives
(
(5η−2)piγ2/η
4(2+η(6η−7)) −
2η+12η2(pi−1)−pi(7η−1)
2+2η(12η−7) uγ
1/η
)
, and the
term
∫ pi
2
0
∫ r0
0
(
1− 1γ2g(r)g(d)
)
dS gives
(
ηpiγ2/η
4(1+η)+
ηuγ1/η
2η+1
)
. After
summing up,
I(u)&
pi
4
(
η
η+1
+
η+2
(η−1) (η−2)
+
5η−2
2+η (6η−7)
)
γ2/η +(
pi
2
+
3η
(4η2−1) (η−1)
−
2η+12η2 (pi−1)−pi (7η−1)
2+2η (12η−7)
)
uγ1/η. (23)
In order to approximate the second integral in equation (19),
we note that the behaviour of the term γz−1g(d) depends on
the signal level z which is continuous over [z1, z2). One way
to simplify the approximation is to bound the integral using
the maximum value of the signal level,∫
Sco
∫ z2
z1
(
1−
1
1+γg(r)
1
1+γz−1g(d)
)
fZc(z)dzdS ≥∫
Sco
(
1−
1
1+γg (r)
z2
z2+γg (d)
)
dS.
(24)
We can expand the right-hand side of the above inequality
similar to equations (20)−(22). Though, we will have to
modify some of the integration limits and the way that the
angle φ (r), separating between small and large distances d,
is computed. Firstly, in order to calculate the term I1(u),
we will still carry out the integration over 0 ≤ r ≤ γ1/η,
but the angle φ(r) = min
{
pi
2 , arccos
(
r2+u2−(γ/z2)2/η
2ur
)}
.
Secondly, the term I2(u) is calculated after integrating over
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Fig. 6. Illustrating the accuracy of the approximations made in Lemma 3.
The connection probability of the receiver (blue curves) is calculated at the
corner using equation (7b) and approximated using equation (28). The quantity
Jco(u) (black curves) is calculated numerically based on equation (12) and
approximated using equation (25). The probability of secure connectivity (red
curves) is evaluated after substracting Jco from the connection probability.
Pathloss exponent η=4, user density λ=0.2, distance u= 1
2
, d0=1.
γ1/η≤ r≤u+
(
γ
z2
)2/η
, and using the updated expression for
φ (r). Finally, the term I3(u) is calculated after integrating
over r≥u+
(
γ
z2
)2/η
.
Note that for u≤1, we have z2=1, and the probability p to
experience signal level Z=1 at the eavesdropper is larger than
1
2 , see the Appendix. Therefore using p=1, in the calculation
of Jco(u) for small distance separations u≤1 introduces small
approximation error, see Fig. 6 (set of black curves).
Jco(u)&exp
(
−
λpiγ
2
η
4
( η
η+1
+
η+2
(η−1) (η−2)
+
5η−2
2+η (6η−7)
)
−
(pi
2
+
3η
(4η2−1) (η−1)
−
2η+12η2 (pi−1)−pi (7η−1)
2+2η (12η−7)
)
λuγ1/η
)
. (25)
Finally, recall that all approximations made, i.e., expansion
for the terms 11+γg(r) ,
1
1+γg(d) in equations (20)−(22), leading
order terms in equation (23) and inequality (24) are lower
bounds to the integrals, thus the approximation would upper-
bound the quantity Jco(u), see Fig. 6.
Following similar steps, the integral I(u) in the bulk is
dominated by the following two terms for a large γ and a
small distance separation u
I(u) & 2
∫ r0
0
∫ pi
0
(
1−
1
γ2g(r) g(d)
)
dS+
2
∫ ∞
r1
∫ pi
0
(
1−
1−γg(r)+γ2g2(r)
(1−γg(d)+γ2g2(d))
−1
)
dS,
(26)
where the factor 2 is used to account for angles pi≤φ≤2pi.
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Fig. 7. Probability of secure connectivity at the corner and in the bulk using equation (11). Pathloss exponent η=4, user density λ=0.2, d0=1.
The leading order terms in equation (26) can be computed
following similar steps to equation (23)
Jbu(u) & exp
(
−
(
η
η+1
+
η+2
(η−1) (η−2)
+
5η−2
2+η (6η−7)
)
λpiγ
2
η
)
.
(27)
Comparing with equation (23), we see that the coeffi-
cient of γ2/η in the bulk, as expected, it is equal to the
respective coefficient at the corner after scaling by four.
In addition, in the bulk, the approximation of the integral
I(u) at high transmission rates does not require a correction
term depending on the distance separation u. This is due
to the following reasons: (i) in the bulk, the mean and the
variance of interference are location-independent and, (ii)
the terms 2γ2
∫ pi
0
∫∞
r1
g(r)g(d)dS and 2γ4
∫ pi
0
∫∞
r1
g2(r)g2(d)dS
accept a total correction −4piuγ1/η at high rates, but this
is cancelled out due to the terms 2γ3
∫ pi
0
∫∞
r1
g2(r)g(d)dS and
2γ3
∫ pi
0
∫∞
r1
g(r)g2(d)dS.
Having approximated the terms Jx(u), the approximation of
the connection probability of the receiver at high transmission
rates Rt is rather trivial. It can be done using different
expansions for the term
γg(r)
1+γg(r) at small and large distances
r. The connection probability of the receiver at the corner is
P
c
co,r & exp
(
− λ
(∫ pi/2
0
∫ γ1/η
0
(
1−
1
γg(r)
)
dS+
∫ pi/2
0
∫ ∞
γ1/η
(
γg(r)−γ2g2(r)
)
dS
))
& exp
(
−
λpi
4
(
η
η+2
+
η
(η−1) (η−2)
)
γ2/η
)
.
(28)
The quality of the above approximation for the connection
probability is illustrated in Fig. 6, set of blue curves.
The connection probability in the bulk for a high trans-
mission rate Rt can be approximated following the same
steps with equation (28), Pcbu,r & e
−4λc1γ2/η , where c1 =
pi
4
(
η
η+2+
η
(η−1)(η−2)
)
.
The ratio of the probabilities of secure connectivity in the
bulk and at the corner as γ→∞ is
lim
γ→∞
P
sc
bu(u)
Pscco(u)
= lim
γ→∞
e−4c1λγ
2/η
− e−4c2λγ
2/η
e−c1λγ2/η − e−c2λγ2/ηe−c3uλγ1/η
(a)
= 0,
where c3>0 is the coefficient of uγ
1/η in equation (23), c2 is
the coefficient of γ2/η in equation (23), and (a) follows from
0<c1<c2 ∀η>2.
Lemma 4. For secrecy rate Rs = 0 and small distance
separation u between the receiver and the eavesdropper, the
transmission rates Rt=log2(1 + γ) maximizing the probabil-
ity of secure connectivity in the bulk and at the corner are
related as γ∗bu=2
−ηγ∗co.
Proof. Using the leading order γ2/η in equation (23) and
equation (28), the probability of secure connecticity at the
corner can be approximated as the difference between two
exponentials, Pscco≈e
−λc1γ2/η−e−λc2γ
2/η
. This kind of function
accepts a maximum at γ∗co=
(
log(c2/c1)
λ(c2−c1)
)η/2
. For η=4, we get
γ∗co=
11025 log(54/35)
361λ2pi2 , which is close to the value seen in Fig. 6.
Similarly, the transmission rate maximizing the probability of
secure connectivity in the bulk is γ∗bu =
(
log(c2/c1)
4λ(c2−c1)
)η/2
, thus
γ∗bu=2
−ηγ∗co.
Recall that in Lemma 3 the plane has been divided into three
areas w.r.t. to the distance r from the receiver, i.e., r≤r0, r0<
r < r1 and r ≥ r1. The extension of Lemma 3 for positive
secrecy rates Rs > 0 is tedious because for µ 6= σ we need
to separate between more cases while identifying the areas
where the terms µg(r) and σg(d) accept different expansions.
Apart from that, the proof will follow exactly the same steps
with Lemma 3. Furthermore, given Rs = 0, a generalization
for arbitrary d0 will only modify the separation distance to
r0 =
(
γ
g(d0)
)1/η
instead of r0 = γ
1/η used in Lemma 3. The
expressions in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 will also look more
complicated because for d0>1, s=
γ
g(d0)
instead of s=γ.
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Fig. 8. Average capacity with secrecy assuming known CSI at the transmitter w.r.t. to the eavesdropper location. In the bulk, the results are generated for
intensity of interferers equal to λ as well as λ
4
. Pathloss exponent η=4, user intensity λ=0.2.
In Fig. 7a we see that the probability of secure connectivity
is higher in the bulk for low transmission rates Rt (correspond-
ing to µ=1) confirming Lemma 1, and higher at the corner for
high transmission rates (corresponding to µ=10), confirming
Lemma 3. Same behaviour is observed for Rs=0 in Fig. 7b,
where we see that for increasing distance separation between
the receiver and the eavesdropper, the receiver performance at
the corner outweighs the performance in the bulk over a wider
range of transmission rates Rt.
V. AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY − KNOWN CSI
Let us denote by f(γr, γe) and F (γr, γe) the PDF and the
Cummulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the joint SIR
distribution at the receiver and the eavesdropper, where the
dependency on the location is omitted for brevity. The inner
integral in equation (2) can be read as
IR =
∫ γr
0
(log2(1 + γr)− log2(1 + γe)) f(γr, γe) dγe
= log2(1 + γr)
∫ γr
0
f(γr, γe) dγe−∫ γr
0
log2(1 + γe)
∂2F (γr, γe)
∂γr∂γe
dγe
(a)
= log2(1 + γr)
∫ γr
0
f(γr, γe) dγe−
[
log2(1+γe)
∂F
∂γr
]γr
0
+
1
log(2)
∫ γr
0
1
1 + γe
∂F
∂γr
dγe (29a)
(b)
=
1
log(2)
∫ γr
0
1
1 + γe
∂F
∂γr
dγe, (29b)
where (a) uses integration by parts, and (b) uses that ∂F∂γr =∫ γe
0 f(γr, y) dy, thus the first two terms in equation (29a) are
cancelled out.
After substituting equation (29b) into equation (2) we get
C
sc
x(u) =
1
log(2)
∫ ∞
0
∫ γr
0
1
1 + γe
∂F
∂γr
dγedγr
(a)
=
1
log(2)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
γe
1
1 + γe
∂F
∂γr
dγrdγe
=
1
log(2)
∫ ∞
0
1
1+γe
[F (γr, γe)]
∞
γe dγe
(b)
=
1
log(2)
∫ ∞
0
1
1+γe
(Fe(γe)−F (γe, γe)) dγe
=
1
log(2)
∫ ∞
0
1
1+γ
(Fe(γ)−F (γ, γ)) dγ
(c)
=
1
log(2)
∫ ∞
0
E
{
e−γIx,r
}
− Jx(u, γ)
1+γ
dγ, (30)
where in (a) we have changed the order of integration, (b)
uses that F (∞, γe) = Fe(γe), see for instance [45, Chapter
6], with Fe(γe) being the CDF of the SIR at the eaves-
dropper, and (c) uses that Fe(γ) = 1 − E
{
e−γz
−1Ix,e(u)
}
,
F (γ, γ) = E
{(
1−e−γz
−1Ix,e(u)
) (
1−e−γIx,r
)}
, and Jx(u, γ)
stands for the joint connection probability of the receiver and
the eavesdropper given in equation (12) for µ=σ,γ.
Equation (30) indicates that for computing the average
secrecy capacity with known CSI one has to integrate the prob-
ability of secure connectivity in equation (11) for µ= σ , γ
over the derivative of the rate function. Another way to put
equation (30) is to see that the transmitter has to sacrifice some
of its rate to achieve PLS, and the amount of loss depends
on the location of the receiver, the eavesdropper and the
interference effects, incorporated into the quantity Jx(u, γ).
C
sc
x (u) = Cx −
1
log(2)
∫ ∞
0
Jx(u, γ)
1 + γ
dγ, (31)
where the average transmission rate without secrecy is Cx =
1
log(2)
∫∞
0
1−Fr(γ)
1+γ dγ, see for instance [46], and Fr(γ) is the
CDF of the SIR at the receiver.
For independent interference at the receiver and the eaves-
dropper, F (γ, γ) = Fe(γ)Fr(γ), and the analysis in [41,
Equation (12)] is confirmed. In Fig. 8, we depict the average
capacity with secrecy after evaluating equation (31) numeri-
cally. The results are also verified by simulations. We see that
placing the receiver at the corner offers higher average capacity
for all distances between the receiver and the eavesdropper,
even if the intensity of interferers is four times higher than
the intensity of interferers in the bulk.
Lemma 5. The average secrecy capacity with known CSI at
the transmitter is higher when the receiver is located at the
corner than in the bulk even if the intensity of interferers at
the corner is four times higher.
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Fig. 9. Probability of secure connectivity at the corner and in the bulk w.r.t.
the SIR threshold γ and the location u of the eavesdropper. Pathloss exponent
η=4. The user density is λco=0.2 at the corner, and λbu=0.05 in the bulk.
Proof. Based on equation (30), it suffices to show that the
probability of secure connectivity for µ = σ , γ is higher
at the corner than in the bulk for all γ. This is possible
to show as follows: Firstly, for a high γ and a small dis-
tance u, the probability of secure connectivity at the corner
can be expressed, according to Lemma 3, as Pscco (λ) ≈
e−λc1γ
2/η
−e−λc2γ
2/η
e−λc3uγ
1/η
. In the bulk, the probability
of secure connectivity is Pscbu
(
λ
4
)
≈ e−4
λ
4 c1γ
2/η
−e−4
λ
4 c2γ
2/η
,
see Lemma 3. For a positive u > 0, Pscbu
(
λ
4
)
< Pscco(λ) due
to the fact that c3 > 0 ∀η > 2. Only in the limit γ → ∞,
we get that Pscco(λ) = P
sc
bu
(
λ
4
)
. If the distance separation is
large, we can use the approximations in Lemma 2, Pscco (λ)≈
e−xγ
2/η
(
1− EZ
{
e−xγ
2/ηz−2/η−yγ1/ηz−1/η
})
and Pscbu
(
λ
4
)
≈
e−xγ
2/η
(
1− EZ
{
e−xγ
2/ηz−2/η
})
, thus Pscbu
(
λ
4
)
<Pscco(λ) for
y > 0. Secondly, for a low γ, the probability of secure
connectivity is dominated by the mean interference at the
eavesdropper, see equation (15). Due to the scaled intensity
of users, the mean interference at the receiver is equal at the
corner and in the bulk, however, the mean interference at the
eavesdropper is higher at the boundary for u> 0 than in the
bulk. Therefore Pscbu
(
λ
4
)
< Pscco (λ) for a low γ too. Example
illustration using numerical integration of equation (11) is
available in Fig. 9.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have calculated the probability of secure
connectivity and the average secrecy capacity in a Poisson field
of interferers. The receiver performance has been assessed
in the infinite plane and also at the corner of a quadrant,
and the results have been compared. The analysis shows
that hiding the receiver at the corner can provide secrecy
enhancement for high dara rate applications. Exposing the
receiver at less interference than the eavesdropper is beneficial
for physical layer security, even if the boundaries enhance
the spatial correlation of interference. On the other hand, for
low-rate applications, the impact of boundaries is detrimental
because the interference level is reduced overall, and the
eavesdropper can mostly decode the low-rate transmissions. In
that case, applying further secrecy enhancement techniques,
e.g., transmission of jamming signals could be of use to
increase the interference level at the boundary. Studying the
performance of secrecy enhancement techniques over finite
areas, also with more complex geometries, is a direction for
future work.
APPENDIX
The RV X describing the distance between the trans-
mitter and the eavesdropper, X = ‖d0e
jΘ − u‖, ranges in[
|u− d0| ,
√
d20 + u
2
]
. Due to the fact that the RV Θ follows
the uniform PDF in
[
0, pi2
]
, one may calculate the PDF of X
fX(x)=
4x
pi
√
x2 − (u− d0)
2
√
(d0 + u)
2
− x2
.
For u ≤
√
1− d20 with d0 ≤ 1, the distance X becomes
smaller than one with probability p = 1. After integrating
the PDF of the distance fX(x), one can calculate that for
{u≤d0, u≥d0 − 1} and {u≥d0, u≤d0 + 1}, the distance
becomes smaller than one with probability
p=1−
2
pi
arctan


√√√√ (d20 (1+α2)−1)2
(2αd20)
2
− (d20 (1+α
2)−1)
2

 ,
where α= ud0 .
Due to the fact that the distance-based pathloss g(r) be-
comes equal to unity for distances smaller than one, the
RV Z follows in general the mixture distribution fZ(z) =
p δ(z − 1) + (1− p) fZc(z), where δ (·) is the Dirac delta
function. The PDF of the continuous RV Zc=‖d0e
jΘ−u‖−η :
Zc<1 can be derived from the distance distribution fX(x) and
it is equal to
fZc(z)=
1
1−p
4z−1−
2
η (piη)
−1√
z−
2
η−(u−d0)
2
√
(d0+u)
2
−z−
2
η
, z1≤z<z2,
where z1=
(
d20 + u
2
)− η2 and z2=1.
For the pairs {u, d0} giving p = 0, the RV Z becomes
continuous in [z1, z2] where z2= |u− d0|
−η
.
For the simplified case d0 = 1, p=
4
pi arctan
(√
2−u
2+u
)
for
u≤2, and p=0 for u>2. In that case, the computation of the
mean link gain can take a compact form for pathloss exponent
η=4. We give below the expressions for the mean link gain
for u≥2. For u<2, we give the mean of the continuous part
of the distribution
E {Z} =
4u(u2−1)+(1+u2)2(pi+4arctan( 1u ))
pi(u2−1)3(1+u2) , u≥2.
E {Zc} =
2(1+u2)
(
2 arctan( 1u )−arcsin
(
3u−u3
2
))
(1−p)pi(u2−1)3 +
2u(2−(1+u2)
√
4−u2)
(1−p)pi(u2−1)(u4−1) , 1<u<2.
E {Zc} =
3
√
3−2
2pi , u=1.
E {Zc} =
2(1+u2)
(
2 arctan( 1u )+arcsin
(
3u−u3
2
)
−pi
)
(1−p)pi(u2−1)3 +
2u(2−(1+u2)
√
4−u2)
(1−p)pi(u2−1)(u4−1) , 0<u< 1.
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